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5
The Reform of Social 




This chapter provides a critical perspective on the policy direc-
tion followed in Portugal after the reform of social security pensions 
in 2007. First, it examines and assesses the main legislative changes 
introduced in that year by the former socialist government. The reform 
has been presented to the public as unavoidable, intended to improve 
fi nancial sustainability while preserving the overall logic of the system. 
The chapter argues that it did not have a limited impact in the structure 
of the pension system, as it has introduced a fundamental change of 
perspective regarding the objectives and principles of pension policy. 
It also tries to show how the Portuguese process of reform has been 
infl uenced by political decisions from the EU, by focusing on restric-
tive rules that guide economic policy and the EU strategy for pensions. 
Economic policies inspired by the New Classical Economics paradigm 
and an agenda for pensions aligned with supply-side oriented economic 
policies have been important features in national pension policy. A 
particular emphasis is attributed to the critical infl uence of economic 
performance on pension systems’ budgetary equilibrium, arguing that 
economic failures explain, to a great extent, much of the problems iden-
tifi ed in Portugal.
The chapter is organized as follows. The fi rst section describes the 
main measures introduced by the reform program of the social secu-
rity pension system introduced in 2007. The second section develops a 
critical analysis of that reform. It examines its adverse effects regard-
ing pensioners’ well-being and its methodological incoherence. Next, it 
describes the path change introduced in the objectives and principles of 
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policy, concluding that although pay-as-you-go fi nancing has not been 
replaced by funding, its overall logic has changed. The next section ex-
amines the infl uence of the EU on the Portuguese reform process. The 
supply side–oriented economic policy paradigm, dominant at the EU, 
helped create an economic environment since the early 1990s that has 
favored the introduction of pension reforms. However, the social policy 
agenda set at the EU aligned with that paradigm has also been an impor-
tant element in the reform process. Finally, the last section emphasizes 
the critical relevance of economic performance on social security bud-
getary equilibrium, arguing that the budgetary diffi culties identifi ed in 
the present are mainly the result of restrictive macroeconomic policies 
unfavorable to employment and growth. A paradigmatic change in eco-
nomic policy is a necessary condition to allow a different orientation 
for pension policy.
MAIN LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
In Portugal, social security is fi nanced by a total contribution rate 
of 34.25 percent of earnings paid by the employee and employer. Out 
of this total, employees pay 11 percent and employers pay 23.25 per-
cent. These contributions fi nance old-age benefi ts (20.21 percent, since 
2010), survivors’ benefi ts (2.44 percent), unemployment benefi ts (5.14 
percent), and disability benefi ts (4.29 percent). The contributions also 
fi nance sickness, parenthood, and occupational disease. The legal age 
of retirement is 65, but benefi ts can be received at age 55 for work-
ers with 30 years of contributions (with penalties for early retirement), 
though the award of early retirement benefi ts has been temporarily sus-
pended from 2012 through 2014, except for the long-term unemployed.
The social security pension plan in Portugal was reformed in 2007.1 
This plan is mandatory for the employees and self-employed workers 
in the private sector. Civil servants are covered by a separate plan.2 
Other plans also exist but cover a limited percentage of the total active 
population.
This reform introduced three important changes in regard to retire-
ment benefi ts. First, a “sustainability coeffi cient” was introduced in the 
formula for calculating pensions. This coeffi cient is a demographic ad-
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justment factor, which reduces pensions by a certain percentage as life 
expectancy increases. It is equal to the ratio between life expectancy 
in 2006 and life expectancy in the year preceding retirement. The level 
of statutory pension is multiplied by the coeffi cient and is thus reduced 
as life expectancy increases. The decrease in pensions may be partially 
offset if workers decide to postpone retirement or if they increase their 
voluntary contributions to a new complementary public plan of indi-
vidual accounts.
Second, the formula for calculating pensions was changed. After 
2007, pension levels are calculated taking into consideration the earn-
ings of the entire working life. Since 1994, pension levels were calcu-
lated on the basis of the average earnings of the 10 best years of the 
fi nal 15.3 A 2002 law stated that the earnings of the entire career would 
be taken into account for calculating the pension.4 However, it also de-
fi ned a transitional period, 2002–2016, during which the most favorable 
method of calculation—the former, the latter, or a weighted average 
of both—could be applied in order to guarantee benefi ciaries the most 
favorable rule to determine the pension level. For that reason, the full 
impact of the measure was not felt. During the transitional period, only 
approximately 17.5 percent of pensions were calculated based on the 
earnings of the entire career, the method that could guarantee the most 
favorable pension amount (European Commission 2005, p. 2). The re-
form of 2007 accelerated the transition to the new method of calcula-
tion. The pension is determined by a weighted average of two terms: 
one is based on the best 10 years of earnings of the fi nal 15, the other 
is based on the earnings of the whole career. The weight of each term 
depends on the moment of retirement and the length of the contribu-
tory career up to a specifi ed moment of reference. For those who retire 
before 2016, the moment of reference is 2006; for those who retire after 
2016, the moment of reference is 2001. 
Third, new rules for indexing the benefi ts were approved, which 
came into effect in 2007.5 The new method does not guarantee the 
maintenance of the real value of all benefi ts. Higher benefi ts will be 
indexed to prices only for higher rates of economic growth. In addi-
tion, the minimum wage is no longer used as reference for determin-
ing minimum pension levels. The process of gradual convergence of 
the minimum level of pension with the national minimum wage started 
almost 10 years before and was completed in 2005.6 In 2006, pension-
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ers with a career longer than 30 years were entitled to a pension equal 
to the minimum wage (net of employee contributions), and those with 
shorter careers were entitled to a certain percentage of the net minimum 
wage. However, immediately after, there was a reversal of this policy. 
A law published in the end of 2006 stated that thereafter the adjust-
ment of the minimum levels of pensions should be dissociated from the 
minimum wage.7 A new term of reference for calculating and adjusting 
the benefi ts is used, the Indexante de Apoios Sociais (IAS), which is 
defi ned every year by the government. As a consequence, the minimum 
pension level started to diverge from the net minimum wage, as Table 
5.1 shows.
The reform also introduced new rules to encourage older workers 
to stay in the labor market such as higher penalties for early retirement 
and incentives to extend working life. 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PORTUGUESE
REFORM PROCESS
A Reform Focused on Cutting Spending 
The reform was presented to the public as necessary to contain 
pressures on the social security budget and guarantee its fi scal sustain-
ability (Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity [MTSS] 2006a,b). The 
policy solution chosen was based exclusively on the reduction of ben-
efi t levels.
The option of cutting pensions is particularly adverse in the Portu-
guese case because, at the time the reform was introduced, the retired 
population had on average lower incomes and higher incidence of pov-
erty than the rest of the population (Murteira 2008). This is explained 
by the late development of the Portuguese public pension system and 
by work histories characterized by low earnings and short contributory 
periods. Table 5.2 shows that more than 80 percent of old-age pension-
ers were entitled to an amount of pension lower than the national mini-
mum wage. Thus, the strategy followed has placed the burden of the 
adjustment exclusively on pensioners, particularly on pensioners with 
the lowest incomes.
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However, some analysts argue that the decrease in the benefi t lev-
els should not be a reason for concern because, up to 2007, the system 
could guarantee high replacement rates. Thus, the system could be con-
sidered “generous.” This argument, although frequently mentioned, is 
not strong. It is important to understand why replacement rates were 
high while the majority of old-age pensioners received very low bene-
fi ts. Analysis from previous research (Murteira 2008) helps to clarify 
this question. The average gross replacement rates were broken down 
by income quintile for several cohorts of men and women who retired 














2006 385.90 343.45 343.45 100.00
2007 403.00 358.67 354.10 98.70
2008 426.00 379.14 363.81 96.00
2009 450.00 400.50 374.36 93.50
2010 475.00 422.75 379.04 89.70
2011 485.00 431.65 379.04 78.20
2012 485.00 431.65 379.04 78.20
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 5.2  Distribution of Old-Age Pensioners in 2005, by Pension Levels









frm 2997.6–3747.0 2,555 0.19
Total 1,371,529 100.00
SOURCE: Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (2006a).
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before the rule change. The disaggregate data on replacement rates 
helps to explain the paradox. High replacement rates did not refl ect the 
generosity of the social security pension system. The highest replace-
ment rates were those of pensioners, especially women, with very low 
wage levels who were entitled to a minimum pension level. A high per-
centage of women had low incomes and short working careers. These 
women were entitled to a minimum pension level that was higher (in 
many cases much higher) than their previous wages. Thus, the fact that 
replacement rates were high does not mean that the system provided 
generous benefi ts. High replacement rates and low pension levels were 
two faces of the same coin.
Moreover, the reform may also be criticized from a methodological 
standpoint because it has focused on the means of policy (spending on 
pensions) and neglected its ends (the social objectives). The objectives 
to attain, in regard to income security, are not reported either in the text 
of the law or in the document that reveals the strategic lines of the re-
form (MTSS 2006b). The State Budget Report (Ministry of Finance and 
Public Administration [MFAP] 2006) presented the estimated effects 
of the new rules regarding the future reduction of public spending on 
pensions and the future decrease of real growth of average pension, as 
Figure 5.1 shows. This outcome was considered positive. 
This conclusion results from a biased perspective that consists of 
assessing policy only by its budgetary consequences, ignoring the es-
sential purpose of pension provision. The obsession with the means of 
pension policy has led to the neglect of the ends. An appropriate assess-
ment of pension policy should focus on its ends, looking at the means 
in view of the ends. As the purpose of pension plans is to provide re-
tirement income security, a consistent policy design requires a clear 
specifi cation of this aim. Spending on pensions should be seen as the 
“constraint” to face, rather than the “objective,” as Barr and Diamond 
(2008, p. 33) have observed. 
The view that motivated the reform undertaken in the fi eld of social 
security pensions in Portugal, based on cutting benefi ts in order to alle-
viate fi scal problems, represents a way of approaching the welfare state 
that has been deeply criticized by Atkinson. In particular, the author 
underlined the tendency to look exclusively at costs without consider-
ing the benefi ts of the welfare state: “The whole purpose of welfare 
state provision is missing from the theoretical model” (Atkinson 1999, 
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p. 8). In the Portuguese debate the purpose of pensions was completely 
absent. As a consequence, the level of benefi ts has been taken as the 
adjustment variable in a policy aimed at containing spending.
The Structural Nature of the 2007 Reform
The reform was presented to the public as merely parametric, 
aimed at improving fi nancial sustainability while preserving the overall 
logic of the system. However, there are sound reasons to argue that this 
reform had an important impact in the structure of the social security 
pension system. Thus, it might be better defi ned as structural. 
The fi rst reason is that it has produced a signifi cant decline in the 
level of benefi ts, for both present and future pensioners but mainly for 
the latter. The three main measures introduced reduce the benefi t levels 
because they affect both the replacement rate and the earnings path in 
the retirement period. 
The replacement rate will decrease signifi cantly over time because 
of the introduction of the “sustainability factor.” According to the 
OECD (2007, p. 68), future benefi ts are expected to decrease around 


















SOURCE: Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (2006).
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20 percent as a result of the link to life expectancy. The replacement 
rate also decreases due to the new way of determining the benefi ts that 
are now based on the earnings of the entire career rather than the fi nal 
earnings. Since working careers generally present rising earnings in 
later years, when pensions relate to the earnings of the entire career, the 
replacement rate is lower. Historical experience has shown that when 
pensions could be calculated according to the most favorable rule, be-
tween 2002 and 2004, only 17.5 percent of the new pensions were de-
fi ned according to the new rule (European Commission 2005, p. 2). As 
a consequence, with the new formula, the large majority of pensions 
became more distant from the workers’ fi nal earnings and from the level 
of average earnings current in society at the time of retirement, meaning 
that replacement rates were reduced. 
Moreover, pensioners’ benefi t levels over the retirement period will 
continue to diverge from the overall earnings path in society due to the 
unfavorable method of adjusting the benefi ts over time. 
Thus far, the adverse effect of the reform on pensioners’ economic 
well being has not been entirely felt: there is a transitional period for 
the application of the new calculation rule; the infl uence of the sustain-
ability coeffi cient will be felt more acutely over time; and the negative 
effect of the new indexation rules is cumulative. The reduction of future 
pensions will be signifi cant. OECD (2007) has estimated that future 
benefi ts will be more than 30 percent below the level pensioners would 
have been entitled to before the reforms. However, the reduction of fu-
ture pensions might be higher than expected because of the effect of the 
new indexation rules, which is unpredictable.
The second reason for arguing that this reform was structural is 
that, although not explicitly, a new perspective regarding pension pol-
icy objectives has been adopted. The objective is no longer to enable 
people to maintain the previous living standards, but to provide a mod-
est income protection. 
A growing divergence between pension levels and wage levels was 
implicitly accepted. First, the new calculation rule expresses a different 
choice of objectives for pensions. When the objective is to safeguard 
the previous living standards, the benefi ts should be related to the fi nal 
earnings. When pensions relate to the earnings of the entire career, they 
will diverge from workers’ fi nal earnings and from the average earn-
ings current in society at the time of retirement. Second, the change in 
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the way of adjusting pensions over time allows a growing divergence 
between pensioners’ earnings path and the overall earnings path in the 
society. Both the reduction of the replacement rates for the majority of 
the retired population and the new rules of adjusting benefi ts over time 
show that the objective of enabling people to maintain the previous liv-
ing standards in retirement has been abandoned. The new objective is to 
provide a modest income protection in retirement. A conception of so-
cial assistance, rather than what Myles has described as “contemporary 
notions of social security” (Myles 2002, p. 158), inspired this move.
The strategy of lowering pensions occurred at the same time the 
government declared the prevention of poverty among the elderly as 
a political priority. However, instead of reinforcing minimum income 
protection, the government has decided to dissociate the minimum pen-
sion levels from the minimum wage. At the same time, it has introduced 
a new means-tested benefi t intended to alleviate old-age poverty (com-
plemento solidário para idosos).8 In the text of the law that introduced 
this benefi t it is stated that the previous policy of general increase in the 
minimum levels of benefi ts was not sustainable and that it should be 
replaced by the strategy of concentrating the benefi ts of those in need.
Thus, the right to a minimum pension of the earnings-related plan 
has been questioned as a work-related right and started to be replaced 
by national solidarity mechanisms justifi ed in case of need.
Furthermore, another profound change has occurred: the nature of 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG). The idea that it is possible to maintain in re-
tirement the living standards achieved in the working period, which 
inspired the previous policy, was questioned. 
The initial PAYG plans organized a mechanism of solidarity through 
work. Retirement pensions, like other social benefi ts, were guaranteed 
by the collectivization of a share of the total wages. In such a plan, the 
amount of contributions is immediately redistributed in the form of so-
cial benefi ts (pensions, unemployment benefi ts, sickness benefi ts, etc). 
In the original conception, a PAYG plan is contributory—benefi ts are 
defi ned on a commutative basis; since they are related to the employ-
ment status, their purpose is to replace earnings and require previous 
contributions—but it may involve a certain degree of redistribution in 
order to realize a set of social objectives. Therefore, benefi ts do not need 
to be strictly linked to contributions. A PAYG plan may include redis-
tributive mechanisms such as the rules that establish minimum pension 
up14msssapch5.indd   109 1/31/2014   10:06:03 AM
110   Murteira
levels, the rules that guarantee higher replacement rates for the lowest 
incomes, or a calculation formula that takes into account the earnings 
of the fi nal working years instead of the earnings of the whole career.
When the purpose is to safeguard in retirement the living standards 
achieved in the working period, pension levels should be close to the 
fi nal wages. In this case, the pension may be seen as a “continued sal-
ary” (Castel 2009a,b; Friot 2010). This logic requires high replacement 
rates and indexation rules that guarantee a similar growth of pensions 
and wages over time. 
Recently, PAYG plans in some countries have abandoned the previ-
ous logic, which based the right to resources on work and made pension 
levels dependent on the previous wage levels. In some cases, these plans 
have moved to a savings logic. Accordingly, each individual should be 
entitled to a sum of benefi ts closely related to what he has paid during 
his working period. Thus, the link between lifetime contributions and 
expected benefi ts should strengthen at the individual level. In this view, 
pensions are justifi ed by the existence of “previous savings” (the con-
tributions) and seen as an individual deferred income (Castel 2009a,b; 
Friot 2010).
In Portugal, the transition to a savings logic has already started. The 
logic of work-related rights is vanishing as the link between pensions 
and wages weakens. The reduction of the replacement rates, caused by 
the new pension formula and the introduction of the sustainability coef-
fi cient, increases the gap between the fi rst pension and the fi nal wages. 
These new rules contribute to strengthen the contributory nature of the 
plan and, thus, to the gradual transition to the model of pensions as in-
dividual deferred income. Also the new rules for indexing the benefi ts 
contribute to increase the gap between pensions and wages over the 
retirement period. Moreover, the link between pensions and wages also 
weakens due to the divergence of the minimum pension levels from the 
minimum wage. The plan is still PAYG but has a changing nature: the 
wage reference is disappearing, while the system moves from a work-
based logic to a savings-based logic. 
Thus, although the rule changes are parametric, the overall effect of 
the reform is structural: the level of future benefi ts will decrease signifi -
cantly, social objectives have changed from safeguarding the preretire-
ment living standards to the guarantee of a modest income protection, 
and a new logic is ruling PAYG.
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THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL RIGHTS
RETRENCHMENT IN PORTUGAL
The Portuguese social security pension system has been experienc-
ing increasing political pressures. In recent years, we have identifi ed a 
two-stage strategy for social rights retrenchment. Each stage presents a 
specifi c confi guration. 
In the fi rst stage, marked by the 2007 reform conducted by a center-
left government, the pressures were intended to contain spending. How-
ever, as observed ealier, this reform introduced signifi cant changes in 
the structure of the social security pension system.
In the second stage, when a new right-wing government came into 
power in June 2011, the strategy for social rights retrenchment assumed 
a new confi guration. The revenue side of social security budget has 
come under growing pressure. The new government has introduced 
several measures that reduce, directly or indirectly, the receipts from 
contributions. All the variables that infl uence the receipts from contri-
butions came under pressure: the wage, the level of employment, and 
the contribution rate. In regard to the public sector, the government, in 
agreement with the troika (the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), has decided to 
reduce wages and employment. The private sector is recommended to 
follow the same route of wage reduction. In any case, wage reduction 
in the private sector is expected to occur as a consequence of massive 
unemployment. The third variable, the rate of contribution (taxa so-
cial única), has also been under downward pressure. The government 
has planned to reduce the employer contribution, arguing that it would 
reduce labor costs and thus improve the level of employment and ex-
ternal competitiveness of the economy. But, in regard to the reduction 
of the employer contribution, the government had to step back because 
of strong political opposition. These measures were planned when the 
social security budget was already extremely destabilized by the serious 
recession and massive unemployment that followed Portugal’s bailout 
in May 2011. Massive unemployment has caused a signifi cant decrease 
in receipts from contributions, an increase in spending on unemploy-
ment benefi ts, downward pressure on wages, and the growth of early 
retirement.
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At the same time, a new political discourse has emerged. Invoking 
the excessive economic burden of social security, the government has 
introduced a new political speech on this subject intended to justify ad-
ditional regressive reforms. The prime minister has announced that the 
reform of 2007 is not enough to guarantee the fi nancial sustainability 
of the social security pension plan and that it is necessary to shift to-
ward more funding and more private voluntary provision. Meanwhile, 
in April 2012, the government suspended the access to early retirement 
during the fi nancial assistance period.9 The fi nancial assistance pro-
vided to Portugal after May 2011 by the European Central Bank, the 
European Commission, and the IMF was given on the basis of a policy 
program that required economic policy conditions. Following the de-
mands of austerity established in the Memorandum of Understanding 
with the the troika, the new government has imposed deep cuts in ex-
penditure, mainly in the wages of public servants and pensions, but also 
in a set of other social benefi ts, health care, and education. In 2013, 
after the periodical reviews of the troika for assessing the progression 
made with respect to the policy criteria specifi ed in the memorandum, 
the government has accepted to impose additional cuts in expenditure. 
The focus will be on major budjet items, particularly the government 
wage bill and pension spending. A new reform of social security may 
be announced at any time.
The Infl uence of the EU on the Portuguese Reform Process
To understand the Portuguese reform process, we should not ana-
lyze it in isolation because it was signifi cantly infl uenced by European 
prescriptions. The management of economic policy, imposing restric-
tive rules for the conduct of fi scal policy, and the social policy agenda 
set at the EU were important elements in that process.
The 2007 reform pensions, as well as the agenda of the current gov-
ernment, can only be understood by taking into consideration the social 
policy agenda set by the EU. The standpoint that has been adopted by 
both the previous and the current government is in line with the social 
policy paradigm dominant in the EU. This one is aligned with the para-
digm that has guided economic policy, especially since the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992. In order to clarify this subject and understand how the 
EU has infl uenced pension reforms in the member states, it is worth 
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mentioning the pressures imposed by restrictive macroeconomic policy 
and the infl uence of the European strategy for pensions.
The Economic Policy Paradigm Dominant in the EU 
Especially since the Maastricht Treaty and the policy orientation 
adopted for the introduction of the single currency, the macroeconomic 
policy in the EU was defi ned in accordance to the prescriptions of the 
New Classical Economics (NCE). The same occurred with labor market 
and social protection policies.
The NCE defends monetary and fi scal policies based on rules rather 
than discretionary decisions of governments (Creel 2011). As the latter 
are considered to be moved by electoral purposes, rules are the only 
way to assign credibility to economic policies, a fundamental condition 
for guaranteeing its effectiveness. Therefore, economic policies should 
be ruled by restrictions imposed on the objectives or on the means. 
Monetary policy should be conducted by an independent central 
bank and be committed to the objective of price stability. This com-
mitment is fundamental in order to stabilize economic agents’ anticipa-
tions and keep labor costs under control. In regard to fi scal policy, it 
should also be guided by strict rules. Two arguments justify it (Creel 
2011). The fi rst is the “Ricardian equivalence,” stated by Barro (1974), 
according to which an expansionary fi scal policy has no effect on the 
level of economic activity. The argument may be summarized as fol-
lows: If a government tries to stimulate demand by increasing spending, 
the reduction of public savings will be offset by an increase of private 
savings. As people make perfect predictions of the effects of economic 
policy—assuming the rational expectations hypothesis—they will save 
more in the present in order to afford the future tax increases that will be 
necessary to pay off the increased debt. As a consequence, total spend-
ing will remain unchanged. Thus, demand-management intervention 
by governments is ineffective. The second argument states that the in-
crease of the public debt may lead the central bank to increase money 
supply. According to the monetarist view, this will cause an increase in 
the price level. Both the ineffi ciency of fi scal policy and the importance 
of keeping price stability are arguments that justify the imposition of 
strict limits to budgetary policy.
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Since Maastricht, EU countries have been submitted to a “culture of 
discipline” in the rules that guide macroeconomic policy (Fitoussi and 
Laurent 2009). According to the view that prevails in the EU, fi scal and 
monetary policy should have a limited role in stabilizing economies. 
The European Central Bank is responsible for guaranteeing the exclu-
sive objective of monetary policy that is price stability. National fi scal 
policies have also been severely restricted by the Stability and Growth 
Pact and have been focused on the objective of balancing the budget. 
According to the dominant view, the role of the state in economic ac-
tivity should be reduced to improve the performance of the economy. 
Therefore, it is essential to limit the growth of public expenditure. For 
this reason, a clause that prevents the governments from appealing to 
the European Central Bank to fi nance its defi cits has been introduced. 
As a consequence, the governments have become dependent on deregu-
lated and globalized fi nancial markets. 
Policies for the Labor Market and Social Protection
According to the paradigm that inspires European economic policy, 
growth and employment should not come through expansionary mac-
roeconomic policies. These are replaced by the so-called structural re-
forms, such as the deregulation of the labor market or welfare retrench-
ment. Structural reforms in these two domains are recommended as a 
way to avoid distortions in the functioning of the labor market, promot-
ing effi ciency, and preventing high levels of public defi cits and debts. 
Policies for the labor market and social protection have been con-
ceived in articulation with the supply-side orientation of economic poli-
cies. In regard to the functioning of the labor market, in this perspective 
unemployment is supposed to be caused by the malfunctioning of the 
labor market. It is considered largely voluntary, occurring when wages 
are above the level needed to clear the labor market. The source of mas-
sive unemployment is considered to be excessive regulation and high 
labor costs. Thus, the recommended solution is to make labor markets 
more fl exible. Less regulation and the reduction of labor costs (wages 
and social contributions) are advocated in order to promote employ-
ment and the external competitiveness of economies. 
Social spending, in turn, is considered unfavorable to economic 
growth. Social protection mechanisms are regarded as something that 
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disturbs the market process. Welfare state programs, and social security 
pension plans in particular, are accused of contributing to the increase 
in the size of the government, causing ineffi ciency and originating huge 
public defi cits and debts. It is assumed that the provision of welfare 
should not rely exclusively on public intervention. Instead, it should al-
low an increased role for the market, that is, private plans and voluntary 
provision. Additionally, pension plans should contribute to improve la-
bor market effi ciency by promoting employment and competitiveness. 
Thus, they should focus on containing labor costs and providing ben-
efi ts that do not create disincentives.
Pressures Imposed by EU Macroeconomic Policy
The pressures for reforming social security pensions imposed by 
economic policies in the EU have been underestimated in most of the 
literature on the subject. In particular, the signifi cant infl uence on pen-
sions of the rules that guide fi scal and monetary policies in the EU 
should be underlined. 
Since the Stability and Growth Pact, governments have been di-
rectly pressured to tighten fi scal policies (Fitoussi 2002, 2004). The im-
perative of balancing the budget has led the governments to cut public 
spending in general, and spending on pensions and other social transfer 
programs in particular. This fact has led to an attentive supervision of 
spending on pensions by the EU institutions charged with economic 
and fi nancial affairs. 
The imposition of the Maastricht “culture of discipline” in macro-
economic management materialized into restrictive fi scal and monetary 
policies (Fitoussi 2002, 2004). These policies have imposed indirect 
pressures on social security budgets. As restrictive macroeconomic pol-
icies have depressed growth and employment, they have undermined 
social security budgetary equilibrium. Under these circumstances, the 
pressure to impose reforms in social security pension systems increases.
The European Strategy for Social Security Pensions
At the same time, EU institutions have built a common political 
view about social security pensions, which is aligned with the main-
stream in the international debate on pensions, inspired by the recom-
mendations of the World Bank (1994) and the OECD (1996). 
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In the EU, social security pension system reform has been included 
in the political agenda after 1999. The effects of aging on pensions’ 
spending have been under attentive supervision by the EU institutions 
charged with economic and fi nancial affairs as a consequence of the 
budgetary discipline imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. The 
member states were asked to adopt measures in order to guarantee the 
fi nancial “sustainability” of PAYG plans by containing future spending 
and by encouraging the development of funded plans and voluntary 
provision. During the 1990s, and following these recommendations, 
many European countries have introduced reforms in social security 
pension plans with the implicit or explicit aim of containing spending. 
Since 2001, the strategy designed for the fi eld of pensions was pur-
sued through the open method of coordination (OMC), which aimed to 
promote an increasing coordination of national reforms by building a 
consensual perspective regarding pension policy. It has contributed to 
defi ne common principles and objectives, establish a common set of 
indicators to assess national pension arrangements, and offer periodic 
monitoring of progress made toward the common objectives. Although 
it has not imposed the same orientation to all member states, the OMC 
has been infl uential for decisions on national pension policy: it has con-
tributed to build a shared view that has been translated into orientations 
for pension reforms. Palier (2006) has described the OMC as “a new 
form of intervention which is less aimed at institutional harmonisation 
or legislation than at harmonising ideas, knowledge and norms of ac-
tion, in order to have common policy goals converging towards ‘a com-
mon political vision’ . . . The aim here is to achieve a Europeanization 
of social policy paradigm” (p. 8).
As mentioned earlier, the EU pension policy agenda is focused on 
reducing spending and organizing the plans in order to strengthen the 
“competitiveness” of national economies. First, it is assumed that the 
provision of welfare should not rely exclusively on public intervention; 
an increased role for the market should be allowed. Second, pension 
policy orientations are confi gured to meet the requirements of eco-
nomic policies supply-side oriented. This view emphasizes that both 
contributions and benefi ts affect the functioning of labor markets. Pen-
sions and other social benefi ts are analyzed in terms of their effects on 
labor costs and the incentives they embed. First, as the contributions 
required for fi nancing pensions are a component of the labor costs, the 
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contribution rate should be contained in order to avoid reducing labor 
demand. Therefore, cuts in social contributions are advocated to im-
prove the performance of the labor market by favoring employment and 
the external competitiveness of economies. Second, generous pensions 
disincentivize the labor supply of older workers. Thus, in order to im-
prove the functioning of the labor market to promote employment and 
competitiveness, pension policy should focus on containing the contri-
bution rate to avoid the increase in labor costs, on providing benefi ts 
that do not create disincentives, and on “activating” older workers (Eu-
ropean Commission 2006, p. 18).
This shared view inspired the reform programs developed in many 
member states, after 2003, like the one introduced in Portugal in 2007. 
The analysis of the progress in reforming pension systems in these 
countries, after the second round of the OMC (European Commission 
2006), has identifi ed common lines of reform. The conclusion was that, 
since 2003, when the fi rst comprehensive analysis of national strate-
gies in the area of pensions was reported (European Commission 2003), 
a general move has been observed in many member states regarding 
some features that may be summarized as follows. First, many coun-
tries have introduced rule changes such as incentives to extend working 
lives or disincentives to early retirement, the strengthening of the link 
between contributions and benefi ts, and the inclusion of life expectancy 
in pension formulas. Second, in many cases, the level of guaranteed 
minimum pensions has been increased to prevent the risk of poverty. 
Third, private provision has been promoted. It was recognized that, in 
general, the reforms caused the decrease in social security pensions, but 
it was admitted that it could be “compensated by longer working lives 
as well as by higher personal savings” (European Commission 2006, 
p. 3). Obviously, in Portugal these common lines of reform have been 
replicated in 2007. 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND PENSION POLICY: PENSION 
POLICIES IN A CONTEXT OF INCREASING LONGEVITY 
The increased pressures on public fi nances caused by an aging 
population has prompted many authors and policymakers who criticize 
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state intervention in this sphere to recommend that the governments 
promote ambitious reforms of pension systems by means of rolling 
back spending. The “unsustainability/roll back argument” (Barr 2000b, 
p. 740) has been spread and consolidated as common sense. 
Despite the recurrent use of this simple argument, it may be mis-
leading because it neglects the decisive infl uence that economic per-
formance has on the social security budget. The present diffi culties in 
pension system fi nancing are, to a great extent, the consequence of the 
economic dysfunctioning. Therefore, the analysis of pension policy 
should not be dissociated from the debate on macroeconomic policies. 
Economic Growth, a Fundamental Issue
The economics of pensions has shown the relevance of promot-
ing economic growth in order to face population aging.10 Thompson 
(1998) has shown that, from an aggregate and real perspective, the eco-
nomic cost of retirement equals the consumption of goods and services 
of the retired in relation to the total production of goods and services. 






where CR represents the consumption of retirees and Y represents total 
income. The analysis of this simple expression allows us to take two 
fundamental conclusions. First, retirement costs do not depend only on 
the consumption of retirees, but also on the level of total income. Thus, 
output is a central variable, as Barr (2001, 2004) and Barr and Diamond 
(2008) have emphasized. Second, pensions represent a claim on the 
output (Barr 2004). 
Thus, the problem with pensions is essentially a distributive issue: 
it is the question of defi ning the rule that specifi es pensioners’ share in 
total income. Pensioners’ income share depends on the distribution of 
income between capital and labor and on the division of the labor in-
come between workers and pensioners. Thus, the social bargaining that 
leads to income distribution and so defi nes capital and labor shares and 
the political decision regarding the way the latter is divided between 
workers and pensioners are critical issues. 
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To sum up, in society’s perspective, pensions represent a claim on 
the output. If life expectancy increases, other things equal, pensioners’ 
share in spending will grow. At a given level of output, the adjustment 
may be realized by increasing contributions (of the employer or the 
employee), by reducing the benefi ts, or by increasing the legal age of 
retirement in line with rising life expectancy to avert the growth of the 
dependency ratio. However, in order to face rising life expectancy there 
is also a fourth solution: to increase the supply of goods and services. 
So, policies that promote economic growth are central. If the output 
grows, the distributive problem will become easier. There are two basic 
strategies for rising output: to increase labor productivity or to increase 
the number of workers (by reducing unemployment, by increasing 
women’s participation in the labor market, by rising the legal age of 
retirement, or by immigration). 
The public debate on the future of pensions has focused on two of 
the possible options: reducing pensions or increasing the age of retire-
ment. In both cases, the burden of the adjustment is placed on the el-
derly. The relevance of policies that promote economic growth and full 
employment as a means to deal with future problems posed by demo-
graphic aging has been underestimated. However, a serious debate on 
pension policy cannot be dissociated from the debate on the model of 
macroeconomic regulation, income distribution in society, and the way 
labor income is divided between workers and pensioners. 
The problem posed by the change in the age structure of the popula-
tion—an increasing share in spending—has to be faced independently 
of the method of fi nancing pensions. A shift toward funding would not 
avoid it. As Barr (2004) has shown, PAYG and funded plans represent 
two sorts of claims on future production, that is, two different ways of 
claiming the share of pensioners in national output. In the fi rst case, 
the question is decided in the political process. In the second case, the 
question is decided in the market sphere. If the role of private plans and 
of voluntary provision increases, the pressures on public fi nances will 
reduce—because the retirement costs will not burden the public bud-
get—but the economic cost of retirement will rest unchanged, unless 
it could be proved that a shift toward funding would lead to a higher 
increase in output. It is often argued that funding increases savings and 
hence will lead to higher productive investment and economic growth. 
Although there is a vast economic literature on this subject, there is a 
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great controversy regarding both the causal link between funding and 
saving and the effect of saving on productive investment.11 
Economic Policy and Pension Reforms in Portugal
The EU has declared concern for the future of pensions. However, 
European macroeconomic policies followed in the last two decades, 
inspired by the prescriptions of the New Classical Economics, have not 
been conceived in order to promote growth and full employment. In-
stead, the restrictive rules that have guided macroeconomic policies, fo-
cused on restrictive fi scal policy, price stability, and a strong euro, have 
depressed growth and employment, especially in peripheral countries 
like Portugal. Economic policies have contributed to deepen the social 
security budgetary problems and thus helped to present the reforms as 
unavoidable. Moreover, in Portugal, as in many developed countries, 
labor income share has decreased signifi cantly in the last decades.
In Portugal, population aging has provided the argument to the for-
mer center-left government to restructure the system by reducing spend-
ing on pensions. In the years preceding the 2007 reform, social security 
has been characterized by a signifi cant fi nancial destabilization. The 
budgetary diffi culties identifi ed were, to a great extent, the outcome of 
economic policies—restrictive fi scal policy, monetary policy focused 
on price stability, and a strong euro in a context of external trade liber-
alization—that have depressed growth and employment. Since the in-
troduction of the single currency, Portugal has experienced a decade of 
low growth and increasing unemployment, as Table 5.3 shows.
A low rate of economic growth and unemployment are big threats to 
the fi nancial balance of social security. The offi cial diagnosis mentions 
it: “As a consequence of a set of negative factors, like the slowdown of 
economic growth, a parallel increase in unemployment, the maturation 
of the system and the consolidation of schemes of anticipation/fl exible 
age of reform, we have assisted, in the last fi ve years, to an increased 
deterioration of the fi nancial balance of the social security system . . . ” 
(MTSS 2006a, p. 14).
Unemployment leads to the decrease in contributions and to a 
downward pressure on wages, which translates into lower contribu-
tions. Moreover, it causes an increase in spending on unemployment 
benefi ts and favors early retirement. In this context, retirement may 
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Table 5.3  Real Growth Rate of GDP and Unemployment Rate
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP real growth rate (%) 3.40 1.70 0.80 −0.80 1.30 0.50 1.40 2.40 0.00 −2.90 1.40 −1.60
Unemployment rate (%) 3.90 4.00 5.00 6.30 6.70 7.60 7.70 8.00 7.60 9.50 10.80 12.70
SOURCE: Banco de Portugal.
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be the appropriate alternative for older workers facing the risk of un-
employment. Early retirement becomes more frequent and creates ad-
ditional fi nancial pressures on pension systems. The budgetary prob-
lems identifi ed were also conditioned by the increased maturity of the 
system, mentioned in the same report. Furthermore, these diffi culties 
were aggravated by several measures of reduction or exoneration of 
contributions, expanded after 1999 with the purpose of stimulating em-
ployment, based on the idea that high labor costs are the main cause of 
unemployment. Population aging has also imposed fi nancial pressures, 
but at a slow and gradual rate.
Thus, economic policies have contributed to deepen the budgetary 
problem and, as a result, to present the reform as unavoidable. At the 
same time, the social security plan came under growing political pres-
sure. In particular, the recommendations from the EU level, regarding 
benefi t retrenchment and the design of the plans, have been infl uential 
for decisions on national pension policy. 
THE PRESENT CRISIS
The present crisis has revealed the adverse effects of economic 
policies oriented by the New Classical Economics in stabilizing econo-
mies with regard to growth, employment, and the external equilibrium 
of several member states, particularly the peripheral nations. After the 
global recession in 2008, some EU countries had to face problems of 
public debt fi nancing. However, in order to manage the crisis, the lead-
ers of the EU have imposed budget austerity to these countries, thereby 
contributing to deepen the recession and worsen the public fi nance cri-
sis. The governments were asked to cut their defi cits even when they 
had to face serious recession. 
According to the understanding of European leaders, the present 
crisis is the consequence of the lack of rigor and effectiveness in the 
governance of the euro zone. Thus, discretionary decisions of national 
governments and parliaments with regard to fi scal policy should be 
subject to additional constraints in order to enforce budget consolida-
tion. The commitment to this view has been embodied in the fi scal pact 
signed in March 2012 by European leaders. Expansionary fi scal policy 
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is considered ineffective with regard to growth and responsible for in-
creasing defi cits and debts. The proposed solution to promote growth 
is to deepen structural reforms, which should improve competitive-
ness at the national level. Inspired by this view, European leaders have 
called for additional regressive reforms of the labor market and welfare 
systems. Thus, a “race to the bottom” for wages and social benefi ts is 
emerging.
As a consequence, welfare systems have been under growing 
pressure. Restrictive rules on monetary and fi scal policies result in a 
growth path that puts social protection systems under increasing stress 
in times of recession, since the receipts from contributions decrease 
while social expenditures are increasing. However, structural reforms 
promoting labor market fl exibility and welfare state downsizing have 
not reduced massive unemployment in European countries, as predicted 
by the New Classical Economics. Instead of acting in favor of growth 
and employment, the decline in wages and social benefi ts has caused a 
decrease in effective aggregate demand and thus contributed to deepen 
the recession. 
CONCLUSION
The 2007 reform of the social security pension system in Portugal 
was presented to the public as fundamental to contain pressures on the 
social security budget and guarantee its fi nancial sustainability. The re-
form has been described as merely parametric, aimed at reducing the 
level of benefi ts for improving fi nancial sustainability while preserving 
the overall logic of the system. However, it did not have a limited im-
pact in the structure of the social security pension system. It might be 
better described as structural.
This chapter has argued that the Portuguese process of pension re-
form was deeply infl uenced by European guidelines and policies. The 
economic policy paradigm dominant in the EU helped to create an eco-
nomic environment since the early 1990s that has favored the introduc-
tion of pension reforms. Since Maastricht, the imposition of restrictive 
rules in macroeconomic management has contributed to impose pres-
sures for reforming pensions. As the governments were recommended 
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to cut spending on pensions and other social transfer programs, there 
were direct pressures to lower public defi cits and debts. There were also 
indirect pressures, since restrictive rules on fi scal policy have caused the 
slowdown of growth and the increase of unemployment, destabilizing 
social security budgetary equilibrium. However, a European strategy 
for the fi eld of pensions, compatible with economic policies supply-
side oriented, was designed in parallel. An open method of coordina-
tion was followed, which has been an important factor in the process of 
reforming pensions in many member states. It has contributed to build 
a common view on this subject and to defi ne guidelines for policy that 
have been translated into common trends in reforms. The Portuguese 
reform in 2007 and the new political discourse that calls for an addi-
tional reform have been aligned with the EU orientation for pensions. 
The chapter has also emphasized that the present diffi culties in pen-
sion system fi nancing are, to a great extent, the consequence of eco-
nomic dysfunctioning. This fact, however, has been underestimated 
in the public debate, which has been dominated by the argument that 
spending on pensions will be unsustainably high because of popula-
tion aging. The use of this simple argument may be misleading as it 
underestimates the decisive infl uence that economic performance has 
on pension systems budgetary equilibrium.
 Economic growth is crucial, as the problem posed by the change 
in the age structure of the population is one of an increasing share in 
spending. If output grows, the distributive problem becomes easier. 
However, economic policies inspired by the New Classical Economics 
have had extremely adverse effects in stabilizing economies with regard 
to growth, employment, and the external equilibrium of several Mem-
ber States, particularly the peripheral nations. A paradigmatic change 
in economic policy is fundamental to allow the appropriate policies for 
growth.
Furthermore, the discussion on the future of social security pen-
sions should not be dissociated from the debate on income distribution 
in society. In a system fi nanced on a PAYG basis, pensioners’ income 
share depends on the distribution of income between capital and labor 
and on the division of the labor share between workers and pensioners. 
Ultimately, pension policy is about political choices.
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Notes
1. Law n.º 4/2007, January 16, and Decree-Law n.º 187/2007, May 9.
2. Signifi cant measures intended to harmonize the public scheme with the scheme 
that covers civil servants were introduced. See Law n.º 60/2005, December 29. 
Notice that Decree-Law n.º 187/2007 also applies to the calculation of pensions 
for civil servants whose working career started after September 1, 1993, in accor-
dance with Decree-Law n.º 286/93.
3. Decree-Law n.º 329/93, September 25.
4. Decree-Law n.º 35/2002, February 19. See also DecreeLaw n.º 17/2000, August 
8, art.º 57º3.
5. Law n.º 53-B/2006, December 29.
6. Ordinance n.º 1316/2005, December 22.
7. Ordinance n.º 1357/2006, November 30.
8. Decree-Law n.º 232/2005, December 29. 
9. The offi cial speech of the present government includes two policy orientations: 
increasing the labor market participation of older workers and promoting comple-
mentary private retirement savings. These orientations seem to have been inspired 
by the proposals of the EU social policy agenda defi ned in the Green Paper (Eu-
ropean Commission 2010) and the White Paper (European Commission 2012).
10. See, for example, Barr (2001, 2004); Barr and Diamond (2008); and Thompson 
(1998). 
11. First, funding might not increase savings, since an increase in mandatory savings 
can be offset by a reduction in voluntary savings. Second, increasing savings might 
not increase productive investment. Savings do not convert automatically into pro-
ductive investment. However, if there is a low rate of economic growth, increasing 
savings may have a depressive effect on the level of economic activity, and thus 
reduce productive investment. Third, an increase in productive investment might 
not have a signifi cant effect on growth. This is the reason why Barr (2004, p. 207) 
argues that funding, as a mechanism intended to promote economic growth, is both 
indirect and debatable. On the effects of pensions on saving and investment, see 
Barr (2004), Barr and Diamond (2008), and Thompson (1998). The “myths” on 
the advantages of funding have been examined by Barr (2000a, 2001, 2004); Barr 
and Diamond (2008); Orszag and Stiglitz (2001); and Thompson (1998).
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